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Some Remarks on Racial Inequality in Brazil
Not so much because the portuguese despised manual
work, as some have emphasized (Sowell 1983), and mainly due
to the historical circumstances that Brazil was not colonized as
a place to run from hungerorreligion persecution, but as part
ofthe mercantile policy ofthe portuguese kingdom,it is feasible
to affirm that, there, the legacy from slavery is, at the same time,
socially harsh, economically ruthless, andpolitically invisible.
ProximitywithAfricamade easy and cheap the permanent
search for new slaves, less costly than to raise slave children.
Brazil imported more than six times the numberofafricans
than the United States, although with a substantial minor
surviving population (Soweel 1983:99).
At the same time, not coming to Brazil to settle with their
families but to explore a tropical environment, the adventurous
travelling of the portuguese was made without women and
without wives.If it is true that, for political reasons, white
Population outnumbered black slaves, so it is also true that
male whites outnumbered females of the same color (Soeiro
1973). Sexually as well as economically abused, slave women
gavebirth to a population not quite black, not quite white, but
certainly slave and susceptible to beating, ill treatment and
hard work.
The fact that slaves in Brazil were allowed by legal
proceduresto buytheir freedom and being that a phenomenon
oflarge proportion during the 19th century (Carneiro da Cunha
1985), associated with the abolishmentofslavery in 1889 being
reached through agreementacrosselite and not as a result of
any kind ofcivil war or bloody conflict between their fractions,
conspired to make race and race prejudice an inconspicuous
issue in the brazilian political agenda.
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So much more repressed, so much more perverted. As
Barrington Moore has argued (1967), open conflicts, specially
when wonbytheright side, have the merit of airing political
realm with the freshness that comes from overt, and thus
negotiable, opposing values andinterests.
In 1987,out ofa populations of59.2 millions ofnon-white
individuals,only 7.7 millions recognized themselves asblack in
Brazil. The other 51.5 millions preferred to be denominated as
colored, mulattos orpardos,acolorthatin portuguese language
means some place between the grey and the brown and that
turned out to beits official denomination by the Brazilian
Institute of Geography andStatistics.
That non-white people preferred to view themselves as not
being black would be of no importanceatall if only brazilian
society would have recognizedit s. That have not been the case.
The aim of this paper is not to show thatthere are social
and economicdifferences between whites and blacks in Brazil,
althoughthesedifferences exist in strong magnitude, so much
more upsetting as color is not usually recognized asa significant
dimensionofsocial identificationand stratification. Untilrecently
its effects couldn't even be measured becausethe question was
not asked bytheofficial bureau ofstatistics '.
This paper highlights somedata onracial inequality from
anotherpoint of view, arguing that there is not a substantial
difference between being black and being pardo, except,
eventually, from a psychological standpoint. Their waysoflife
overlapping inmanyimportant socioeconomicindicators,it can
beaffirmedthat Brazil is a bi-racial society.Init there is a place
for whites andthereis a place for blacks. There is no place for
pardos andthe place that have been assignedto themis that
of black’s. In other words,brazilian society does not provide a
runawayfrom whatshe haddefinedasracial identity. That wil]
be shown alongsomefew,trivial and standardized socioeconomic
indicators: housing facilities, literacy rates and education,
family and personal income,participation in labor force. The
indicators don’t needto be statistically elaborated because the
point can be easily made: pardos and blacks are both treateq
equally bad and equally worsethan the way whitesaretreateq?,
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I fully recognize that my case lacks biological foundation:
probablyvery few persons in Brazil have their ascendant being
all whites or all blacks. But in this case biology is not at all
important and as Pirandello wrote, and as sociologists know
well, if it looks like, so it is.
Housing Indivators
The ways housing facilities, such as running water,
plumbing,electricity or garbage collection are available to the
brazilian population present a large variation according to the
color of the head of the household. Nevertheless, regarding
thesefacilities, being pardo does notmake great difference from
being black: in some important proportion, their homes are
equally precariously attended (Table J).
Thefact thatwaterin Brazil, even ifprovided bygovernment,
cannot be drunk without previously been treated, makes the
possession of domestic filters an important requirement
regarding health care. The proportion of whites possessing
filters is 27.7 more than pardos pees it and 24.3 more
lacks possessing them (Table J).
‘han the aaine way, Toagession of some durable and private
goods,suchas stovesorrefrigerators,doesnotshowsubstantial
variation across non-white groups but the white one is more




Percent of Housing Facilities
Facilities Color
white pardo black
Water 74.3 56.6 63.6
Garbage 66.6 42.5 46.1
Electricity 89.7 71.9 78.3
Filter 76.9 49.2 52.6
Stove 98.7 92.1 92.6
Refrigerator 76.9 49.2 52.5
 
Source: Brazilian Institute of GeographyandStatistics.
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Education
; Prevailing illiteracy in total population shows important
variation in accordanceto color. The rate of illiteracy is lower
amongwhite persons than amongblacks or pardos.This is true
whenconsideringoverall population overfive yearsold.It is also
true whenconsidering only children with age between five and
nine years old. Differences between whites and non-whites are








five years and more 18.0 65.0 63.1
from five to nine years 31.4 60.2 54.3
Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography andStatistics.
Regardless of color, brazilian data show a high rate of
enrollmentofchildren in pre-schoolandfirst grade. Then, they
begin to drop out. Dropping outis less generalized phenomenon
among white than across non-white groups. The numberof
white youngsters in eighth. grade was 59.3% lower than the
numberofchildren in first grade. For pardos and blacks the
numberswere respectively 86.1% and 84.7% lower. The numbers
ae,the nesuipaes that the chances ofa black anda pardo
che whitesone (Tablemn are similar and higher than those
ith an overall high rate of school evasion, it is onkeeto pee thatvery few individuals in Brazil get collegeu on. In 1987, out of a Population of 8.5 millions whose
ages were between 15 and 24 years old, 900 thousands werein
college. Among whites, the proportion of people in college was
16.0%; among pardos, 4.8%, amongblacks, 3.4%,




Color Ist. grade 8th. grade college
White 2.947.711 924.878 1.229.859
Pardo 3.233.030 452.505 219.990
Black 411.664 63.831 39.638
Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics.
Income
Accordingto official criteria, it costs one minimum wage
monthly to survive being poor in Brazil. One minimum wageis
never more than one hundred dollars but often it is less than
fifty dollars.
The modalwhite family incomeis located betweenfive and
ten minimum wages monthly;for black and pardo families, the
modeis between one and two miminum wages. While 21.9% of
white families have a monthlyincome ofmore than tenminimum
wages,this is true for only 7.6% of pardos families and for only
5.6% of black families. On the opposite, while 20.4 % of black
families and 19.2% ofthe pardo families are entitled to less than
a miminum wage monthly, this is true for no more than 9.2%
ofthe white families. Table IV demonstrates segmentation along
racial lines between whites and non-whites. It does not
demonstrates segmentation across non-white categories. Table
V restates the findings and shows that the sameresult is










up to 1 MW 09.2 19.2 20.4
more than 1-2 MWs 13.7 22.9 22.9
more than 2-3 MWs 12.4 15.2 16.3
more than 3-5 MWs 18.1 17.3 17.6
more than 5-10MWs 22.0 14.8 13.9
more than 10 MWs 21.9 07.6 05.6
without income 01.4 02.1 02.3
TOTAL(1) 100.0 100.0 100.0
 
Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography andStatistics
(1) Including those without income or who had notdeclared it.
 
Table V
Personal Income From All Occupations
Income Color
white pardo black
up to 1/2 MW 07.2 15.3 15.7
from 1/2 - 1 MW 11.4 19.7 23.3
more than 1-2 MWs 21.4 24.8 28.5
more than 2-5 MWs 38.7 22.3 21.9
more than 5-10 MWs 11.5 05.2 04.0
athan 10 MWs 09.3 02.5 01.1
out income 07.6 09.5 05.0
TOTAL(1) 100.0 100.0 100.0
 Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography andStatistics.(Including those without declaration of income.
Differently from when considering sexes, there is not
muchsense to assumethat dissimilitude in income between
personsofdifferent colors could be explained by lengthof their
workingday.It is a well known factthat in Brazil people works
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too muchto get a too low income.Thisis true for all colors (Table
vl). Data don’t suggest he existence of a reliable pattern of
differencesin this length that could accountforincome variation
between the three groupsof individuals.
 
Table VI
Proportion of Workers Working 40 Hrs. and More Weekly
Income Color
white pardo black
up to 1/2 MW 49.6 57.0 60.6
from 1/2 - 1 MW 76.7 82.8 83.6
more than 1-2 MW 85.8 87.7 90.2
more than 2-5 MW 85.2 89.2 89.8
more than 5-10 MW 88.0 87.8 93.6
more than 10 MW 89.2 87.2 85.3
without income 63.1 45.2 51.1
 
Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography andStatistics.
LaborForce Participation
Whenconsideringlaborforce,it is important to note what
is going on with women’s work. Some authors have already
noted the expansion offemale labor market in Brazil after 1976
(Saffioti 1979), specially concerning married and educated
women (Sedlacek and Santos 1991).
Activity rates don’t present substantial variation across
males of the three color groups. That is not the case across
women. The behavior of female blacks is dissimilar, although
not in an important magnitude, from the behavior of the two
others groups of women. The presence of black womenin the
labor market is more conspicuous than the white’s and the
pardo’s (Table VI).
Being in the labor market is not the sameas being actually
occupied. Often this presenceis an expression notof real work
but of a desire of getting a work . The fact is that although
Textos para Discussao
activity rates can differ, occupancy rates are practically the








Female 38.6 37.5 44.5
Male 76.6 76.6 76.3








Female 96.2 95.8 95.3
Male 96.8 96.4 95.8
Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography andStatistics.
It also can be observedthat, with the exception ofservices
and, in small scale, of commerce, for the most of the othersectors, including public administration, social services andhenna industry, the pattern continuous to prevail,.reindieneses and pardoshavesimilar chancestofeats oreccstechancesare dissimilar
In Brazil, all workers have the right to have the terms oftheir work contract written in a notebook. This notebookissuedbythe Ministry ofLabor, must be signed by the employerandits notationsrefer to wage,daily hours ofwork and amount
ofcontribution to social security, which guarantees the right tosick pay, maternity benefits, holidays benefits, access to
10
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pensions, a 13thsalary during the year and others benefits from
brazilian labor legislation. Possession of this notebook means
the individual is a real work and,for this reason, in a country
with high under-employment, besides its legal and material
importance, it has a very strong symbolical value. So, the
proportion of individuals in the labor market that possesses
this notebook is the most conspicuous indicator if legal
formalities are being followed by brazilian employers when
hiring their working force.
Whites have the highest formality rate. Within class of
individuals of the same color, women always have the lowest
formality rate. To be at the same timewoman andblack or pardo
adds informality to informality: her formality rate is the lowest
of all. Finally, from this pointofview, it doesn’t mean much to
be black or to be pardo:their formality rates are similiars and






agriculture 20.3 31.4 25.8
manufacturing industry 17.7 12.7 13.8
construction 05.6 07.0 09.2
others industrial activ. 01.3 01.7 01.7
commerce 12.8 10.1 07.8
services 16.1 18.7 24.6
auxiliary industry serv. 03.7 01.7 01.3
transp. and communications 04.0 03.4 03.4
social services 09.4 06.2 05.9
public administration 05.1 04.0 04.2
others 03.7 01.8 02.0
Total 100.0 100.1 100.0
 




Participation in Formal Labor Sector (1987)





Men 67.8 50.5 65.7
Women 58.8 45.5 45.5
Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics.
Conclusions
This paper was not primarily concerned with differences
between whites and blacks or pardosin Brazil. Its concern was
the similitude between black’s and pardo’s socioeco
nomic
status. This sociological proximity was shown in seve
ral ways:
in their housingfacilities, literacy rates, achievem
entofcollege
education, personal and family income, occ
upancy rate and
formal participation in the labor mark
et.




lacks and whites are more mporta
nt than betweenpar
andwhites. But so, statistical
similitude between whites and
pardosis muchless important
than proximity between these
and cs we dealt with very
trivial statistics and very few
socioeconomic status indica
tors. If, dealing withA
indicators, the sametrendis con
firmed,it can be said he 0
millions of people are livin
g in a state that oldfas o
e
sociologists would describe as
false consciousness and mov
m
ones as cognitive dissonance. In o
ther words, there is a ig
chance that a large number of
individuals in Brazil view
themselves differently from the way soci
ety consider who they
are. Theyprobablydo so because color
isan important dimension
of classification and segregation. Ration
al humanbeings, they
knowthe price society charges from ju
st being black and don't
want to pay for it. But so, because anyway
,in thelast, they get
caught, the product of this trappings
ituationis an astonishing
apathy regarding race and rac
e equality.
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‘As there was no agreement about the importance of the question,sometimesit as asked, sometimes it was not and only in 1987 it wasdefinitely incorporated to the National Enquiry on Sample ofHouseholds.
?All data comesfrom the Supplementon Color producedbythe BrazilianInstitute of Geography and Statistics in 1987. The question on colorpresented a range of four possible answers - black, pardo, white andyellow. The chosen answer came from auto-identification. Tries madebefore to formulate the question in an open way produced morethan onehundreddifferent responses, mostofthem highlycorrelated to the pardooption to the question, when it was Presented in its closed formula.
Becausetheyare statitiscally irrelevant, this paperdisregardsindividuals
that have beenclassified in the amazingcolorofyellow.
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The Formation of the Tax State in Brazil
The genesis of incometax!
For centuries in the West, sometimes with legitimacy, for
the mosttimes with violence, kings, barons, and bishops taxed
their subjects. As one authorputit, “fiscal exploitation is the
oldestform ofexploitation besides outright slavery” (Goldscheid
1959: 204).
While tax collection may not be unique to modern states,
these states most certainly could not survive without their
monopoly onfiscal activity. Or, as Schumpeter observes, in
relation to his expressiontaxstate, “fiscal demands are the first
sign of life of modern state” (Schumpeter 1991: 108). It can be
argued that the process by which nation-states are founded
and strengthened can be appropriately accompanied by an
examination ofthe dynamicsthatlead upto fiscal monopoly by
a central power and its gradual channeling toward public
concerns. Modern life requires that state be capable not only of
imposing new taxes and transforming old ones but also of
controlling decisions on how they are to be spent. Just as the
Capitalist enterprise rests on accounting, the transformation of
the state into a public political association, socialized through
the separation ofthe bureaucracyand ofadministrative means,
requires a budget and, as partof that, an explicit tax system
(Weber 1964: 1061).
The purpose of this paper is to discuss one facet of the
foundationofthis tax system in Brazil, that is, how the proposal
to collect a particular tax penetratedstate culture-- in this case
a tax on incomegenerated within the society -- and howthistax,
rejected bythe rulingelite but defended by anumberoftreasury
Ministers starting in the first decades after independence
(1822), was eventually adopted in 1922 and has beenpart of
Brazil’s constitutional life since 1934.
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Neitherin Brazil norin other countries did the income tax
story playitself out swiftly or incontrovertibly; this is precisely
what makesit an interesting topic of political and economic
history.In its realm, the equity principle seemsto conflict with
that of equality, the liberal idea of minimal central power
collides with this power’s propensity for scrutinizing private
affairs, and the impetusto invest be thwarted by public appro-
priation of private wealth. There thus came moments during
which everyone hesitated. In England a tax on income was
enacted and suspendednine timesuntil its definitive adoption
in 1910.In the U.S., the income tax issue sparked an open clash
between Congress and the Supreme Court,the latter declaring
it unconstitutional in 1894, after the federal legislature had
approved it. In France it was called a taxe a sediti6n -- a
seditious tax. And for almost one century it was rejected in
Brazil, first by the Empire’s Council of State, then by the 1891
republican Constituent Assembly, and finally by republican
congresspersons, although defended by the ministers who
oversaw public finances.?
There are at least three explanations for the eventual
acceptanceofthis tax. Thefirst has to do with the new role state
assumed from the second half of the nineteenth century: to
maintain the level of economic activity in balance. Second, as
equity gained footingas a value, the state was assigned a large
part of the responsibility for the welfareofits citizens, prompt-
ing the expansion ofits functions, bureaucracy, and expendi-
tures. Third,the ideal ofa balancedbudget cameto prevail, andthis notion deemeddebts incurred to supportdeficits a threatto a nation’s financial and political stability. To some degree,allthree considerations entered into the Brazilian debate preced-ing enactmentof the tax. But a powerful fourth element wasalso present, onethatbecomesevermore relevant as it becomesmore endemic in the guidanceof the nation’s public affairs:
ppling with successive treasury deficits
Political position of treasury ministers,attimes even undermining government Stability, and likewisepushedtothetop ofthe agendathe question offinance sourcesand, especially, of new fiscal resources.
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Thefocal point of this three-part paperis the rationale of
these ministers and of their interlocutors, especially the impe-
rial Council of State, the 1891 Republican ConstituentAssem-
bly, and a numberof congress persons. ;
Part I examines the three moments at which collection of
a tax on incomes was contemplated under the Empire: during
the Paraguayan War, when the idea was defended by the
Viscount of Jequitinhonha; in 1879, at the suggestion of
Treasury Minister Afonso Celso; andat the outset ofthe 1880s,
in responseto efforts on the part of the ViscountofParanagua.
Difficulties in managing public finances within the peculiar
context of Brazil’s founding as a nation (which evensaw Brazil
paying for its Independence by taking on Portugal's debts to
England) andits ultra-centralized governmentframeworkformed
the backdrop on theseoccasions.In all instances, the Council
of State was the arenafor discussion.
This Council was the monarchy’sbrain.It is thus worth
noting the traits shared by membersoftheelite sitting on this
council: their national much more than regional character;
their homogenous training in Coimbra and in the political
virtues of absolutism; their acceptance of the mercantilist
doctrine; and, accordingly, their capacity to abstract them-
selves from private and market conflicts and make decisions in
the nameofthe Empire (Carvalho 1980 and 1988,Iglésias 1958,
Reis 1979, Santos 1978, Schwartzman 1982).
Part II exploresthefiscal discussion that transpired in the
republican ConstituentAssembly, highlighting therole ofTrea-
sury Minister Rui Barbosa. Thanksto his presence, classical
liberal themes were broached in the proposal to create an
income tax: the individual as master of his own person, the
relation between equality and equity, and, lastly, federalism.
Although Rui Barbosa’s position was defeated, when the tax
was eventually enacted, in 1922, it followed his inspiration:it
was based onindividual declarations in which the individual
‘governed himself; it was progressive; and it distinguished
income on laborfrom incomeonproperty.
The enactmentofan income tax under a 1922 law andits
constitutional consolidation in 1934 are the topics of Part III,
17
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which relates how the chief arguments against this type of
taxation werefinally overturned.Thearistocratic apprehension
that a direct tax wouldbeintrusive and constitute an intoler-
able intervention into private affairs was outmoded by the
modern state’s bureaucratic and impersonal nature.Industrial
protectionism andthe need to support export activities were the
undoingofthe liberal myth ofthe non- interventionist state. The
spreadingbeliefthat, for reasonsoffairness, market-generated
inequalities should be corrected underscored the merits of
direct taxation over indirect. Lastly, the developmentof eco-
nomic theory along marginalist lines showed that taxes were no
obstacle to accumulating wealth and madepossible the en-
forcement of progressive rate schedules.
A final section of the paper is devoted to conclusions.
LThe Council ofState and First Discussions on Income Tax
Shortly after independence,the nation was administered
through executive acts, one ofwhich was a December 30, 1822
decree establishing import duties; another was a January 04,
1823 decree charging the governmentwith collection of export
duties. The evident purpose of these decrees was to create
mechanismsforfinancing the state. As the emperor recognized
upon opening the proceedingsofthe first Constituent Assem-
bly, the Treasury wasalreadyin dire straits -- and so it was to
continue throughoutmostofthe Empire.In describingall ofthe
imperial budgets (from that ofAugust8, 1826, whichwas in fact
limited to the allocation of revenue and expendituresin the ci
and provinceofRio de Janeiro, through that of 1879), Liberato
de Castro Carreira stressed the matter of successive deficits
andobserved that “the ease with which loansare contracted is
the baneoffinances andit is thereby that when a financial
difficulty arises the procedureis not to resolveit by meansof
measuresofan economicnature,thatis, by restricting expen-
ditures or suspending those that may be delayed; rather, the
preferred procedureistosettle it by borrowing”(Carreira 1883:
73).
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The point madeby Senator Castro Carreirais relevant in
the light of the balanced budget concept, which began to hold
sway in the nineteenth century. It is still meaningful today,
because then, as now, new deficits were generally incurred so
thatold deficits and ensuingliabilities could be settled. On the
whole, brazilian budgetarian policies displayed a clear prefer-
ence for borrowing from abroad and issuing bondsbut only a
meagerinterest in tax collection.
In relation to the idea of levying an incometax,first
contemplated in 1843, we mustbear in mind that enforcement
posed two problems:the first, pragmatic in nature, had to do
with the immensity of Brazil's territory, which madecollection
practically infeasible; the second traced its roots to an exclu-
sionary slave-based economic system that producedonly avery
few people with actual incomes. Furthermore,as far back as the
first days ofIndependence,in an important speech delivered by
the emperor, it was made evident the governmentfelt a certain
displeasure in performing the role of tax collector. In the words
ofDom PedroI, Brazil's tax system would respect“the sweatof
agriculture, the labors of industry, the dangersof navigation,
and the freedom of commerce” (Holanda 1974: 60). Thus,
although the Constitution of March 1824 stated that “no one
shall be exempt from contributing to the expenses of the State
in proportionto his assets”, MinisterJosé Clemente Pereirawas
unsuccessful in his 1843 attempt to enforce this precept, the
Chamber of Deputies not approving his proposed law to tax
profits for the first time in Brazil (Holanda 1974: 65).
Nevertheless, as part of the Alves Brancofiscal reform,
budget law 317 of October 21, 1843 instituted a two-year
progressive tax (varyingfrom 2% to 10%)on the earningsofcivil
servants, but only of this group. The law was revoked even
before it could generate proceeds, butfollowingin the heels of
the frustrated attemptto tax profits it nevertheless inaugurated
an important tendencyin the incometax scenario by opting to
tax incomeonlabor(probably because it would be simpler to
prove and easier to collect). By the same token,it also set a
precedent whenit foresaw differentiated treatment, for tax
19
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purposes, betweenlaborwithin the public andprivate sectors;
this approach wasto be adopted repeatedly throughout the
Empire and at the beginning of the Republic.
Although deficits were already a constant problem, the
Paraguayan War undoubtedly deepened concern over public
finance trends.In 1866, Treasury Minister Jodo daSilva Carro
sentthelegislative assembly his budget proposal for 1867-68;
following debates, it was resubmitted to the 1867 Council of
State, whereitwas rediscussed, altered, and approved.In brief,
the proposal examined by the Council providedfor: (1) a tariff
reform that reduced tariffs on raw materials and on some
capital goods and foodstuffs and hiked those on imports of
luxury goods; (2) a tabled tax on homes or housing, whether
leased or owned, even when not place of residence, based on
annual assumed rental income; (3) a tax on occupational
activities, levied via fixed rates or quotas(this tax was progres-
sive and would be called a personal, or quota,tax; rates would
be fixed in accordancewith the nature and class ofthe taxpayer’s
industry or occupation and the commercial importanceof the
place where the occupation was practiced, whereas quotas
would be based on the presumed value of the building or
location wherethe occupations werecarried out); (4) changesin
the values ofstamptaxes andin their required applications;(5)
changes in taxes onslave ownership; (6) standardization of
Tules for the collection of taxes on transfer of property, inherit-
ance, legacy, or slaves; and (7) a progressive tax on civil
Servants’ earnings.
Council meeting minutes indicate that a line was drawnbetween two opposing camps. One demonstrated apparentdislike for the measures in question, even while appreciatingbudgetdifficulties and the size of the deficit. This group wasparticularly averse to the so-called personal tax. As the Vis-count of Abaete’ stated, “Income tax, whatever the ways inwhichit is disguised,[is] unequitable and malevolent both in itsprinciple andin its consequences [and] when it moves fromtheory to practice it opens the way for the most revoltinginjustices [...]. |would prefer some loan to someofthe measures
proposed”(Senado Federal 1973-78, vol. IV: 277).
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Amongthe most impassioned membersofthe other camp,
eventually to prevail, was the new Treasury Minister, the
Viscount of Jequitinhonha, who defended the proposal and
especially the personal tax. Although certain other of the
Minister's allies, such as the Viscountof Itaborai, did not find
the proposal particularly attractive, circumstances compelled
them to go along as well. As the latter Viscountsawit, society
would bericherif there were no personal tax, but, on the other
hand, what the welfare of society (actually the warfare of
society) required at that moment was nevertheless a personal
tax. In the name ofthis same commonweal, the Viscount would
havepreferred thatthe tax notbe progressive but rather purely
proportional, his argumentbeingthat progressive taxes consti-
tute “a permanent threat to accumulated wealth” (Senado
Federal 1973-1978, vol. IV: 284-5).
To all of this the Treasury Minister replied that the
proposed law far from constituted a “financial reform of our
taxes”; it merely would serve to cope with an unfavorable
economic situation whose seriousnessleft no room for hesita-
tion. Not that this meant, however, that the Minister did not
consider incometax a goodidea; the only possible objectionable
point would be the issue of collection. But in relation to this
potential problem, he remarkedthat a Brazilian would rather
pay a tax than admitto his poverty (Senado Federal 1973-1978,
vol. IV: 278).
The reform wentinto effect and for a short time income
wastaxed underthreedifferent modalities. The personal tax --
the most polemic, because it was progressive among other
reasons -- in the end waslevied at lower rates than those
originally foreseen. The second modality was a tax oncivil
servants’ earnings, which excluded those making the lowest
wages. Lastly, a 1.5% tax was charged on the annual benefits
distributed by corporations (Holanda 1974: 75). However, no
matter how important a step this may have been toward the
establishmentof an incometax,the fact was thatthe personal
tax (whichafter a certain incomelevelwas no longer progressive
but rather wholly proportional) remainedin effect only until
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1875, while the tax on civil servant earnings was soon abol-
ished. Furthermore, the format of the personal tax was rather
peculiar, in that it taxed assets rather than income,the former
serving as an indicationofthe latter.
After a small interregnum following the war, government
deficits once again began to mount andtheidea of an income
tax reappeared, sparking debates in both the Chamber of
Deputies as well as the Council of State and,at theinitiative of
Afonso Celso de Assis Figueiredo, new Treasury Minister,
including someofthe regime’s majorfigures.
Muchas wasthe case in 1867, the importanceof these
facts does not issue from their practical effects -- simply
because they didn’t have any-- but from their contribution
to
the long run establishment of a moral universe of individual
obligations (admittedly, material in nature) to support govern-
ment.It is only in this sense that an evaluation of the results
of
an inquiry conducted by Afonso Celso are of interest. On the
whole, his informal surveywas once again to demonstrate that
the system’s noblestelite members were unwilling to admit that
the privilege of social life bears an onus.
Someof the voices heard by Minister Afonso Celso, such
as those of Justiniano Rodrigues, José Mauricio Fernandes
Pereira de Barros, Antonio José Henriques, and José Julio
Dreys, invokedthedifficulties posed bythelogistics of income
tax collection. They argued that they feared abusesofjudgment
would occur in levying a tax considered “difficult
to establish
with any equality, less productive than believed,
and vexatious
to a population not accustomed to direct
collection.” They
predicted it would be “hard to enforce”
and questioned its
practical advantages. The other six
who were consulted ex-
pressed support for the measure. Homero
Augusto Ribeiro had
the mostinteresting opinion to share,
in fact foreshadowing Rui
Barbosa’s declaration before the
republican Constituent As-
sembly; in brief, he compared the income
tax with indirect
taxes, stressingils fairness in relation
to the latter as well asits
reater suitability to the demandsof
administrative rationality.
Based on these opinions, the Chamber's
Budget Commit-
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“It is necessary, as far as possible,to foster administrative
decentralization and strengthen the autonomy of municipal
chambers,lendinglife to this liberal elementofourinstitutions
by means of an improvedclassification of the distribution of
general, provincial, and municipal earnings, withoutwhich any
reform, ofwhatevernature,will have no effect” (Mathias 1973-
78, vol. XI: XXV).
Becausethis reform would greatly bleed central coffers,
Paranagua cautiously defended the income tax as a meansof
compensating for funds that wereto belost. The incomesto be
deemedtaxable would certainly be only the highest, nothing
like the income tax Rui Barbosa was to defend less than a
decadelater.
But Paranaguaalso perceived a merit in this taxation:it
would actto correct“inequality provoked by taxes on consump-
tion, which form the greatest part of the state’s revenue and
place the burden,in its generality, on the laboring classes”
(Mathias 1973-78, vol. XI: 193). This was why Paranagua
opposed the suggestions of someof his peers that the tax be
charged not on incomebutonsalt or tobacco.To the Viscount,
a tax on salt would be a tax on a staple good, and a tax on
tobacco would be a tax on merchandise producedby oneof the
nation’s few industries. As to the territorial tax, he judged that
given “the present state of agricultural property, whose value
has been reducedtoless than half owingto thecrisis inherent
to the transformationoflabor,ifthe lack of a cadastre does not
make[this tax] impracticable,it [will still be] inappropriate and
inopportune” (Mathias 1973-78,vol. XI: 194).
The Council did not buy Paranagua’s reasoning. They
were moved neither by the deficit dilemma norbythealleged
pressing need to decentralize the imperial administration, nor
bythe question ofthe fairnessofdirectversusindirect taxation.
In explicit terms, the conservative voice of council member
Paulino José Soares de Souza echoed what appeared to be a
generalized sentiment:
“As to the incometax |...], I have logically to disagree with
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General Assembly in 1879. The current need is to reduce
expenditures. The deficit that is liquidating our budgets does
not derive from a scarcity of revenue -- revenue whichis often
times reinforced by raising existing taxes and creating new
ones;it derives from an exaggeration in expenditureswhich are
not in proportion to the nation’s productive forces and which
have accelerated to where they are in a more unfavorable
position in relation to national wealth than is the case in other
nations, whose production offers greater guarantees of stabil-
ity. [...] The two sources from which the state obtains the
greatest resources for its revenue are import and export. And
since there is in our nation almost no industry other than
agriculture,it follows thatit is this industry that in the end, by
the hands ofinnumerousintermediaries,bringstothe Treasury’s
coffers the moneythat makespossible public expenditures. The
governmentwell knows howprecariousthestate ofour farming
is and must have informed Your Imperial Highness that it
cannot bear new charges|...]” (Senado Federal 1973-78,vol. XI:
158-9).
Council member Paulino’s opinion on income tax was
shared by most of the other council members, although their
argumentsattimes differed. He feared thatthis tax would fall
uponlarge farmers and exporters; othermembers,likeJeronimo
José Teixeira Junior, feared the burden would be born by wage
earners:
“Thus,for example, includingwages among taxable earn-
ings does not appear fitting to mein the case of a nation such
as Brazil, where the principle requisite demanded for develop-
ing the public wealth is the introduction of wage laborers; and
the most efficacious meansofattracting them is certainly not
the expectation of the burden of a tax on the value of their
wages” (Senado Federal 1973-78, vol. XI: 168).
In thefiscal scenario, the division ofresources among the
Federal Government, the provinces, and the municipalities
formed the crux of the discussions, not only for public finance
reasons but also because underneath itall lie the question of
the imperial regime's unitary character. Itwas therefore notjust
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income tax that was defeated; what was defeated, although no
one actually realized it, was the possibility ofdecentralizing the
regime and thereby breathing into it new life just as it ap-
proachedits final moments. But no one knewthat the regime
was on its death bed andthatpolitical action -- unexpectedly,
as is its nature -- had already triggered the process that would
eventually lead to the creation of a republic meant to be
federative but which would in the end proveoligarchic.
I.Rui Barbosa in the 1891 Constituent Assembly: centralism
versusfederalism in the income tax proposal
The Constituent Assembly of 1891 likewise refused to
accept arguments advancedbythe nation’s Treasury Minister
and did notinstitute an income tax. But if Rui Barbosa was
defeated, the agendaofthe debate he proposed wasnot, andits
very issuesarestill pressing today: how to harmonize federal-
ism with the exercise of a nationally conceived power; how to
dealwith the liberal ambiguity betweentheright to property and
the recognition of demands for some degree of solidarity be-
tween unequal individuals and groups, so that an intended
stable order can be made to work; which formatis ‘fair’ for
individual contributions, that is, progressive or proportional;
how to reconcile two ethics, one of equality and the other of
equity.
In a speech entitled “Organization of Republican Fi-
nances”delivered on December16, 1890 to the membersofthe
Constituent Assembly, the Treasury Minister suggested that
income taxation, as well as its role within the entire set of
budgetary revenues, be examined within the context of a
discussion on the intended format of the republican govern-
ment,particularly the division of public authority between the
states and the central government.
Ifthefederalistprofile formsthe largerbackgroundagainst
which we may understand the emergence ofa proposal for an
incometax within thefiscal debate (Leal 1975), individualism,
fairness, equality, and rightofproperty are the termsofinterest
26
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when the focus is narrowed to this tax alone and to the
engineering of its collection. As Rui Barbosa saw it, the tax
would be progressive, exemptthe poorest, distinguish earnings
on occupations from earnings on capital, and be based on
individual declarations wherethe taxer and the taxpayerwould
be one and the same (Barbosa 1946).
After the Republic had been proclaimed by a military
coup, Marshall Deodoro da Fonseca's provisional government
set up a committee ofjurists entrusted with the task of drafting
a constitution to be voted on by the National Constituent
Assembly. The committee, Rui Barbosa himself, the draft
submitted by the provisional government,and,lastly, the final
constitutional text all agreed that taxes on imported goods
should be the responsibility solely of the Federal Government
(the same would be the case with mail and telegraph taxes). On
the other hand, the states alone would be responsible for
decreeing taxes on the export of merchandise from within their
borders, on rural and urban real estate, on the transfer of
territorial property, on services, and on stamptaxesentailing
documents issued by their respective governments;the states
were barred from taxing federal assets, revenue,or services.
However,when the ConstituentAssembly ratified Rui Barbosa’s
idea that “it is lawful that the Federal Government,as well as
the states, cumulatively or not, create any other [sources of
revenue], so long as not in breachof that which is laid out in
[other articles of the Constitution],” an opening wasleft for
future collection of an incometax, although that was not the
explicit intention of this article. Legislators were to take advan-
tage of this ambiguity of the Constitution of 1891 many years
later, in 1922. The Constitution had notsatisfied Rui Barbosa’s
desires to see an income tax enacted, but it had, however,
provided for alternative forms oftax collection by the Federal
Governmentandstates, without specifying these and as long as
notconflicting with establishedlaw, even if that mightgive rise
to double taxation.
The constitutional agreement was not reached without
conflicts. Forces led by Julio de Castilhos, member of the
27
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Constituent Assembly for Rio Grande do Sul, contested the
government's proposal, arguing that it was centralizing and
would impoverish the states and repudiating the Federal Gov-
ernment monopoly on import duties.It is in the dialogue with
these forces that the government's stance gainsintelligibility.
For, as we shall soon see, if part of the members of the
Constituent Assembly disagreed with the proposal, not even
Rui Barbosa seemedfully satisfied with it, althoughfor opposite
reasons. Thefruit of this disagreementwasa typical result of
negotiations: a compromise that did not maximize the desire of
any relevantactorbut consisted ofwhatwas possible under the
circumstances(Leal 1975).
; Twofactors seem to have motivated theTreas Minister'sntopinions about how important it We that theaefra Governmentretain the bulk offiscal resources:thefirst,¢ aire in nature, had to do with the art ofgood governmenta=daeaea jeacrccies to display “a natural tendenA arbosa 189 1a: 212):
cratic in nature, was his recognition iatdeRepublican
republic. According to Barbosa, nding of the U.S.Union implied a loss ofrights foreachobeenreation oftheunlike in Brazil, where the creation of the Re hiebeneincreased autonomyfor the old Provinces. ‘Aadeeepliedinces, which had nothingto give up, set themselves ahdemany,ing everything, thus making inviable a political life of <nnational inspiration. “Yesterday, we had nothingof a f den2tion. Today, there is no federation enough for us” (Barbosnnevie Minister thus arguedthatfederalism railiesan being the sourceofconstituted
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But concerning the dynamicsof taxation, the Treasury
Minister felt Brazil should, at least on this point, follow in the
U.S.’s tracks, as he perceived them, “concentrating in the
handsofthe Federal Governmentthecollection ofcertain taxes,
today carried out by the states, and entrusting to the govern-
ment of the Union distribution of the product[...]. American
opinion therefore, enlightened by the facts, inclines visibly,
progressively, toward broadening the economic andpolitical
sphere not of the states but of the Federal Government”
(Barbosa 1891a: 156).
The Treasury Minister observed that Federal Government
expenditures were growing, in good measure due to commit-
ments to the states. At the same time, he observed that the
Federal Governmentwas reducedtoliving almostexclusively off
revenue on import duties, and from the pointofview ofdoctrine,
this seemed unsound to him. Whereas the tendency should be
toward reducingthis type of taxation, relying on import duties
to support the Republicirrationally forced the establishmentof
higher andhigherrates: “A national budget destined to nourish
itself perpetually and solely on import duties would be the most
eccentric, the most absurd, and the most harmfulof all eco-
nomic novelties” (Barbosa 1891a: 172-3).
Rui Barbosa and the Deodoro government thus found
themselvesin a double bind:on the one hand,they wereobliged
to defend themselves from accusationsthat they were spending
excessive sums of money, this excess spending being seen as
the causeoftheir difficulties; on the other hand, circumstances
required them to defend a monopoly on collection of a tax that,
as we have seen, Minister Barbosa deemed unsuitable.
Raymundo Faoro once observed that on several occasions
during the Empire Rui Barbosa,a liberal in economicaffairs,
censured the protectionist character of the import duty; when
he was appointed minister, however,he pragmatically accepted
the tax, proposedcollection ofnew ones, and soughtcentraliza-
tion in the handsof the Federal Government. Up until then,
between Hamilton's criticism of protectionism and the protec-
tionism thatthe U.S.in fact practiced, Rui Barbosa had agreed
29
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“While theorists discuss the preferability of indirect ver-
susdirecttaxes, the practical truth,the irrefutable truth,is that
in the currentsituationofpolitical societies, these two forms of
individual contribution to the existence of the state constitute
inseparable elements of balance in budgetary organization”
(Barbosa 1891a: 211).
Although Barbosa madeuseof doctrinaire arguments (a
fair, democratic, etc. tax), what predominated in his defense
were reasonsof state. The civilizing character of income tax
certainly spoke in favorof its collection, but this was not the
most important consideration; after all, other, indirect taxes
were also to be levied, including the anti-liberal import duty,
even though these went against the principle of equity by
placing a greater burden on thoseless capable and notinfre-
quently taking the form of regressive taxation.
The Minister championed taxes held to be unfair -- the
tobacco andalcohol taxes, for instance -- but endeavored to
correct this unfairness by levyinga fair tax, that is, income tax.
He was motivated, however, notby a fair reason but rather by
a practical one:“for financial reasons,”as he said. Butafterall,
what tax was this? What was understood by ‘income’?
Rui Barbosawasexplicit: the proposed interpretationwas
British, that is, the income tax would belevied against gains
derived from property, occupations, commerce,andthetrades.
For the purpose of taxation, any amount above 800 mil-réis
earned on real estate, the exercise of an occupation, bonds,
interestcapital, debts, mortgages,or public employmentwasto
qualify as income.
Three founding elements ofliberalism were stressed when
Barbosa outlined the virtues of this specific tax. The first. of
these wasthatimplicit to the tax’s functioning was a recogni-
tion of the classic possessive individual, sovereign and master
of his own self: second,thatits collection fostered a meeting of
the notions of equality and equity, products of an organic
ambiguity of individualism;third, that the question ofproperty
Tights could be introduced into the sphere of this tax.
The matterof individual sovereignty was to be addressed
technically, in the form thatcollection would take.In synthesis,
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and as the Minister had suggested, the logic of collection was
notto differ greatly from what occurs today, being a mixture of
individual declarations and state monitoring. In newly repub-
lican Brazil, however, it seemed necessary to invoke doctrine to
justify the adopted procedure, not so much because of a
concern with norms and procedures but aboveall because of
doctrineitself, that is to say, because in a nation born of a
tradition both centralizing and personalistic, but which en-
deavored to transmuteitself into a republic, the reiterated
legitimation of the liberal Holy Trinity -- state, federation, and
individual -- seems to be an imposition:
“The tax on income represents,within thefiscal realm, theprinciple of contributive autonomy, of self-taxation, which
constitutes a special manifestation of self-government, bring-ing togetherin thecitizen the doublerole oftaxpayerand taxer.
For this reason, in Prussia, with the Einkommensteuer, as in
England, with the IncomeTax, the introduction of an income
tax basesitself entirely on taxpayer declarations, received and
verified by local committees. Andthe results obtained warrant
for economists resoundingpraises” (Barbosa 1891a: 244).
In short, in a mannerquite peculiar to Brazilian political
institutions, Rui Barbosa subjected the equality principle to
state reason. Contrary to whatwas at that same time alleged in
the U.S.(i.e., the rich were deemed equal in rights to the poor
and therefore it was notlicit to expect them to pay more in
taxes), Rui Barbosa began by concedingthat,for one reason or
another, the poor and the rich did indeed exist and, given that
indirect taxes weighed more heavily on the former, income tax
would be a kind of correction meantto offset the inequalities
arising from these indirect forms. Hestated that it was “[..,]
equitable that the well-to-do and opulentclasses should bear
[...] a heightened burden,as naturally befits them,in exchange
for the semi-exemption that they enjoy in relation to certain
indirect taxes” (Barbosa 1891a: 222). In other words, “where
incomeappears,there shall the tax-collector tax it”: the income
of the pooris taxed indirectly, through what he spendson his
subsistence; the income of the rich is taxed directly and
32
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indi _ In any case, it was accepted that there would be a
Seelywhich income would be exempt, and those who the
Minister called the holdersof“small fortunes” and the “working
class” would be free of this tax burden.“I shall not hesitate
in
advising, regarding the tax on income,that small fortunes
be
exempted, with no fear of breaching the democratic princip
le
that the obligation to heed the State and to support it must
fall
on the shouldersofall citizens” (Barbosa 1891a: 226).
Finally, a third issueofthe liberal discussion was evoked
by the suggestion of an income tax: the coexistence of two
potentially contradictory principles, that ofequal rights derived
from the essential between individuals and that of inequality
derived from the right to property. Concretely speaking, should
earnings on labor be taxed the same as those on capital
accumulation? If yes, wouldn't this mean the legislator was
disregarding the principle of equity and hampering access to
property by those whoheld none?If no, wouldn't thelegislator
be compromising the principle of individual equality and bur-
dening those who accumulated wealth thanks to their efforts
and labors?
That Rui Barbosaoptedfor fairness over equality did not
keep him from realizing the problem washard to resolve. “There
is another equity principle also linked to the tax on income:
earnings derived from personal activity, from steady work,
should not pay as great an onus as those that emanate
spontaneously from accumulated capital” (Barbosa 1891la:
226). In aneffortto clarify his viewpoint, the Minister undertook
an exposition of the ideas of Hume, Babbage, Stuart Mill, and
McCulloch; to some extent, he endeavored to bring England’s
nineteenth-century fiscal debate inside the Brazilian political
class. Two questions were imported from the English discus-
sion: in the first place, whether taxation should be differenti-
ated according to source of income; second, whether rates
should be progressive. The ideas of Stuart Mill and McCulloch
were to prove influential.
Although McCulloch eventually agreed that income earned
in the exercise of an occupation, that is, income that was not
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permanent in character, should notbe tax, ed at theas perpetual income, hedid not alwaysthink along thoaelimes:
cease the Brazilian Minister observed:
‘It fell to Stuart Mill to settle the true i
;
social rationalthe fair economic measureof differentiation, the meoeadiieof
accordingto his needs, so that the: sacrifice ofall willNeteteinpennaiskp offleeting, or uncertainineweat of perpetual, certain income but furthte usufructuary of the formeris subject toa moral obligation°2 personal need, that does not burden the others: thi :obligation of savings, the obligation of creating a sesErve,constantly separating a quota of current incometo reb ildequivalent capital when current income disappears” 31891a: 221). Ppears” (BarbosaMcCulloch, however, who Rui B( \ , arb:
was not in absolute agreementthat “the ae chow iated.” The truth is he was alwaysretic thomy if this wentinto effect did he rec
asto origin of earnings (but noté Progressi
pan's Report at times seemsto mmisiesaie pesoyeatise, for example, McCulloch declared that h ponteGladstone andthat“the income tax does more aiaanrothentax to demoralize and corrupt people” (McCulloch 1975: 141).Thefact that McCullochattimes admitted the existence
of the tax made him noless critical of Progressive collection
contrary to whatthe Minister suggested. Worried about democ.
a to quote,
be gradu-
ent about incometax and
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racies’ capacity to breed “unfairness andfollies,” in his Treatise
hewas adamantin constantlyaffirmingthat redistributionwas
not the task of government. As O’Brien observed, what seeme
d
morally incorrect to him aboutprogressive rates was that “any
attempt by governmentto redistribute income received und
er
the price system would be subversive of all the incentives ofthat
system -- and it would then interfere with growth” (O’Br
ien
1975: XXXV).
Where Rui Barbosa did share opinions with McCulloch
(and with Mill) was their willingness to exempt lower income
brackets -- something that most surely involves a degree of
progressiveness.Althoughit is possible (albeit not certain) that
when Rui Barbosareferred to “graduated” collection he was
expressing an opennessto greater degreesof progressiveness
than those advocated by the two Englishmen, what should be
stressed is that all respected both theright of those who had no
property to constitute their own plus the dutyof the state to
encourage them through reducedfiscal obligations.
Il. At last, the tax
The work of the ConstituentAssembly had hardly come to
a finish and the new Constitution been enacted when the
income tax issue made another comeback. After all, state
finances continued straitened and were made even more un-
wieldy by Rui Barbosa’s economicpolicy that spurred the stock
market boom ofthe early 1890s, known as the Encilhamento;
only under the CamposSallesAdministration were government
accounts to achieve a balance. It was during the intervening
administration of Prudente de Moraes that the Chamberof
Deputies put forward the question of the new tax. Whenthe
issue returned to debate this time around, it was clothed in
Jacobin dress: ‘For what reason, I ask, should those who
Manage moneyandlive off usury escape the tax?”
This questionwas posedby Deputy Serzedelo Corréa.This
legislator and Augusto Montenegro had been distinguishing
themselves in the defense of the measure since 1894. In 1896,
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within the ChamberofDeputies’ Budget Committee, they were
to re-proposeit, intendingit to yield returns the following year
already. They failed to win over their peers, however, who
generally alleged a fear ofcollection problems. Serzedelo Corréa
wasto declarethat, despite his havinglost this round, the tax
wasstarting to gain greater acceptance: “The committee feels
that the tax on income is a corrective measure meant to
compensatethe inequalities of indirect taxes.It is a surcharge
that, rightfully so, should fall on the more well-to-do classes invirtue of the very well-beingthat they enjoy on a greater scale”
(Baleeiro 1938: 27). The factis, however, that in this turn-of-
the- century atmosphere energies were much more concen-trated on the debate over the protectionist import duty than ona tax that did not exist and whose logistics of collection were
dubious.
Just one year after Serzedelo Corréa and AugustoMontenegro's frustrated effort, the issue would return for alongerstay, this time winning the approval of the Chamber ofDeputies’ Budget Committee, although eventually being re-jected by the Chamberitself. The committee agreed to a general
tax on income, whatever its source. As to the procedure for
collection of the taxes by the Treasury, receipts would be
classified in two groups: withholding taxes and taxes that the
taxpayer would pay “at the mouth ofthe coffer.” All taxpayers
were to be chargeda fixed,initial quota, designed to provide the
Treasury with immediate funds. Oncethis quota had beenpaid,
andtooffset its disadvantages, lower-income earnerswere to becompletely exemptfrom any taxeson top ofit. Above the tax-freelevel, rates would be progressive. The draft law intended tocharge a rate of 2% onreal estate earnings, half to be paid bythe ownerandhalf by the renter or lessee. Profits on industrialor commercial activities, interest, dividends, Pensions,or Pub-lic funds would be taxed at 2 1/2%. In administrative terms, itwas supposedthat the taxpayer would file q declaration or elsethat government employees would calculate tax due. Lastlylay-outs were authorized for setting up a suitable collection
structure (Baleeiro 1938: 29-30).
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The debates in Congress revolved aroundthe unconstitu-
tionality ofthis law, a thesis that eventuallyprevailed. Serzedelo
Corra, the law’s proponent one year earlier, argued that the
governmentwould spend morecollecting this tax than it would
actually collect. Thefact is that on the first ofDecemberthe law
wee "oaetehe may be shed onthesignificanceofthis episode
by two observations made then. The first is found in a declara-
tion made by Deputy Felisberto Freire when he witnessed the
draft law voted down, and the second can be found in the
Budget Committee’s presentation of the law. In the Chamber,
Freire spoke out against “the predominanceofthe capitalist
regimein deliberative bodies,for the weight of taxes continued
to be placed on the backsofthe people or the humbleClasses,
through the consumption tax, in 1898 as in 1824.” In the
secondcase, the committee expressed certain misgivings about
its own income tax proposal: “The direct tax, employed so
admirably in nations of ancientcivilization as a device for
correcting the clamorous unfairness of indirect taxes, will
hardlyfitin amongus:it repulses the Brazilian characterat the
sametimethatit does not harmonizeperfectly with the state of
life, the education, and, at the same time, the precariousness
of private fortunes [in Brazil]” (Baleeiro 1938: 29).
Twoideasstill of import today were advancedin relation
to the tax. First, it was argued that a meetingofclass interests
between the political and the economic elites would hinder
collection of a tax which,afterall,fell chiefly on the richest. The
Second idea emphasizedthatdirect taxes not only wentagainst
the Brazilian character's presumed penchantfor unfairness
but would also affect the process of accumulating wealth, a
Serious matter given the national economy’s precariousness.
Felisberto Freire was probablyright in his accusation that
dominantsegments constantly favor dominant segments them-
Selves -- a notion thatis virtually a truism. As various other
thinkers have also perceived,in different contexts,although the
Politician speaks ‘to the people’, he works for interests. As
Madison himselfadmitted, “the most commonandlong-lasting
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cause for factions is the unequal and varied distribution ofproperty. Those who own property, and those whodonot, havealways held distinctinterestswithinsociety” (Madison, Hamilton,and Jay 1988).
It is most likely true that, at the moment of voting,legislatorsfelt sensitivity to issues affecting the guarantees offavored groups. However, everything seemsto indicate that,above and beyond the understandable displeasureit gives therich to pay taxes on their wealth, there prevailed an admittedconcern overthe effects thatthis collection might possibly haveon national development.After the coup andin the period justfollowing the republican dictatorship, debates in the Chamberof Deputies reflected apprehensions regarding the Brazilianeconomy,thatis, the need to supportexport activity andalso,albeit secondarily, to encourage industrialization. Within thisPicture, the income tax was judged an impedimentto capitalaccumulation.
Theself-critical commentmade in the Budget Committee’spresentation of this draft law -- that development depends onprivate savings, whose capacity to be transformedinto invest-mentswould be thwartedbya tax on income-- was anidea thenshared bya variety of thinkers and politicians.Iflevied againstcompanies,it would shrink their rate of return,Iflevied againstlabor, it would discourage productivity. In either case, thenation would lose. This wasin fact what spurred opposition toEngland’s progressive taxation system and a preference for theproportional system,were thetax to beratified. As Webber andWildavsky Have argued,it was necessary for marginalist theoryto be formulatedso thatthe idea of Progressive taxation couldbecomeacceptable to the dominant mentality:“Committed to the Principle of equity and equalityderived from the French Enlightenment, yet holding tonorms of minimal taxation and balanced budgets pro-poundedbyindividualists (which had becomefiscal ortho-doxy, during the previous half century), policymakers
hesitated to raise tax rates. Yet, when confronted with a
growing discrepancy between receipts and expenditures,
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fewand given the massive concentration ofwealth held bya
aise. there was a measure of sympathyfor the view
that the protection the state offered the economyshould be
d for by the main beneficiaries.
net “A aw way of thinking about income, derived from
neoclassicaleconomic theoryformulated after 1870, helped
policymakers resolve the dilemma. Marginal theory pre-
sumesthat, in a free market, an additional increment of
anything has high marginal utility to someone who has
none, while the utility diminishes in proportion to the
it he possesses.
ams universal principle, the diminishing-marginal-
utility postulate is applicable to income as well as consump-
tion. Thus, according to neoclassical theory, while an
incrementof income has high marginalutility to a poor
person becausehehassolittle to start with, it has smaller
marginalutility to someone wealthier, simply because his
incomeis higher. Ideas about progressive taxation, hereto-
fore propoundedonly by rabble- rousers, suddenly became
respectable,clad in scholarly garb. Taxing large incomesat
higher rates than lower incomes was both justifiable and
fair’ (Webber and Wildavsky 1986: 323, emphasis added).
Thus,in duetime, and in muchthe sameway that the idea
of income tax gradually becamepalatableto theelites, the idea
of progressive rates gained impetus. While Brazil’s rejected
1896 law had endeavored to distinguish itself from the English
version, and therefore affirmed that the proposed tax was
Proportional, it in some way accepted progressive rates, as
attested by the exemption granted lower incomelevels.
In any case, the comments on the disadvantages of
incometax found in the BudgetCommittee’s presentation is the
Portraitof a political system caught up in its own ambiguities:
the intent was economicliberalism and moderate state spend-
ing, but the state was placed at the service of export activities
and thus charged with maintaining prices on primary goods
andattracting European immigrantsfor farming. It was agreed
thatthe full developmentofprivate enterprise would depend on
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removingfiscal obstacles, and in the nameof this agreement,incometax was rejected. At the sametime, tariffprotectionismbecameBrazilian fiscal policy’s most important credo.Until 1922, whenlegislation providing for its collectionwas finally voted through the Chamber ofDeputies, the nationcontinued discussing incometax. At certain moments it taxedthe earningsofcivil servants and after 1911 even includedinitsbudget, underan item entitled “Income Tax,” charges againstdividends,interest on corporate bonds and debentures and onmortgage loans, and the profits of limited companies, etc.(Baleeiro 1938: 29).
The tax was enacted under the third article of Law no.4625, ofDecember 31, 1922, and given form in eight items thatmadeit applicable to the net sum of earnings from any sourcereceived by individual taxpayers orlegal entities, exemptingincomesofless than six mnil-réis and allowing deductions forvariousreasons,as long as notin excess of 5% of income. The
would befiled ex officio. Over the years, this law was supple-mented by others that added schedulesfor calculating income.The Constitution of 1934 finally included the matter in its text,charging the Federal Governmentwith collection of the tax, inits sixth article.
history. First, entrepreneurs expressed violent opposition to thetax. Second, at the threshold of the Constituent Assembly of
(Leal 1975).
Industrialists’ objections to the income tax were firstheard in 1919,in response to congressional legislation impos-ing a 3% tax on the Profits and dividendsofthe manufacturingindustry. The most vehement protest camefrom the IndustrialCenter ofBrazil, which declared this a tax “that, overall, shouldonly be admittedin export nations and not in capital-importingnationslike ours.It isa tax that repels capital and that therefore
can only besatisfactorily introducedin nations with an excess
of capital (Carone 1978: 98).
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The inconsistencyof the industrialist position was strik-
ing on that occasion. From the dawn of the Empire,first the
Industry’sAid Society and then,withthe advent ofthe Republic,
the Industrial Center of Brazil requested that their activities be
granted fiscal privileges as well as privileged financing. This
attack on incometax as an inhibitor of private activity was of
liberal inspiration, combatting fiscal roadblocks to private
actions.In short, the industrialists were liberals when charged
taxes and protectionists when it cameto levying taxes on their
competitors’ merchandise.
As to the second order of problems, in a republic that
intended to be constitutionally organized as a federation the
enactmentof an income tax wasto fuel the debate on whether
it was appropriate to entrust collection to the states or to the
Federal Government. Generally speaking,it is agreed that wide-
basedtaxes, such as income or consumption taxes, should be
collected by the Federal Government and be part ofits budget;
narrow-based taxes, such as the territorial tax, are better
entrustedto local administrative units. After the 30’s Revolu-
tion, the draft law that the Provisional Government presented
to third National Constituent Assembly split the income tax,
transferring one, with a proportional base, to the states and
reserving the supplementary progressive income tax for the
Federal Government.
Three camps emergedin the discussion:thefirst, led by
Sampaio Correa and Cincinato Braga, favored a Federal Gov-
€rnment monopoly on taxation andits allocation; a second,
headed by Agamenon Magalhaes and Jodo Alberto, defended
the viewpoint contained in the draft law itself; and the third,
with Prado Kelly at its front, assigned income tax (both the
Proportional part and the progressive supplement) to the Fed-
€ral Government, which should, however, share proceeds 50/
50 with the states. An amendment presented by Carlos
Maximiliano, under which the Federal Government would
Maintain the cedular*/proportional and progressive tax, ex-
cludingreal estate income from the former,finally won out. To
Summarize, the constituentlegislator of 1934 obstructed double
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taxation of real estate revenue while at the same time he
continuedto respect the municipalities’ traditional responsibil-
ity over the taxing of revenue on urban real estate (Baleeiro
1938: 39).
It remains to be added that with the Estado Novo coup
d’tat of November 1937 the Federal Government would appro-priate the territorial and urban taxes from the municipalities.
 
Conclusions
Theroad to legal acceptance of income tax collection inBrazil was paved with controversies, somestill relevant today,others resolved and put behind us. These controversies cen-tered aroundthe following issues: the tax’s ‘perverted’ charac-ter, manifested in how it invaded and pried into the privatedomain; the relative advantages and disadvantages of directandindirect taxes; income tax’s impact on the accumulation ofwealth; its effects on equality, an attribute assumed to beshared naturally by all individuals, and on fairness, which,
more and more, all citizens were presumed to deserve, given
that society madeall unequal. The previous Pages were devoted
to a discussion of these topics, as addressed by the Brazilian
elite.
This concern with safeguarding the boundaries ofprivatelife and, principally, this displeasure in publicly disclosininformation on private wealth -- particularities of the anistoncratic ethic and its conception ofhonor-- wereto prevailessential argument against institution of the income tax in
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demandedthat noble wealth remain silenced, whereas bour-
geois wealth wasa virtue warranting applause.
Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner (1974)
pertinently showed that the conceptof honor, peculiar to the
aristocratic world andintrinsically linked to institutional roles,
became obsolete in the contemporary world, whichfor its part
spawnedthe conceptof dignity. Dignity is essentially fruit of
individual achievement andis available to anyand all who make
an effort to attain it. Only within this new culture can a tax with
characteristics like those of an income tax meet with success.
Rui Barbosa, upon the demise of the Imperial order and
inauguration of a Republican order, perceived this essentially
modern character in that which reaffirmed individual au-
tonomy andits pair, the state.
In Brazil, the defense of income tax generally entailed a
comparison with the effects of indirect taxes, deemed unfair
becausetheywere egalitarian, that is, becausetheyfell equally
on rich and poor.This line of argument was taken up by the
Viscount of Paranagua’ at an 1893 meeting of the Council of
State, called by the emperor. It was also employed by deputies
Serzedelo Corra, Augusto Montenegro, and Felisberto Freire
within the ChamberofDeputies under the Prudente de Moraes
Administration. A like assessment was made by Treasury
Minister Rui Barbosa during the proceedings of the 1891
Constituent Assembly, when he asserted that the income tax
wascivilizing while other taxes were obsolete and not very
democratic, especially import duties, which offended his liberal
conscience. As Minister, however, while he defended the taxing
of income, he wasnotwilling to renounce any ofthe indirect
taxes. To the contrary, he wanted one levied against tobacco
and drink, unlike the Viscount of Paranagu, who had held the
Samecabinetpostat the beginningofthe 1880s and whodid not
feel it advisable to impose charges precisely on branches of
nascent industries.
This evaluationofthe relative advantages and disadvan-
tagesofdirect andindirect taxation was not exhausted with the
8eneralized adoption of incometax. In a 1955 book containing
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a collection of arguments in favor of consumption taxes,
Nicholas Kaldor argues essentially that the defense of income
tax neverrested onits efficiency but ratheronits fairness, that
is, on how well it achieved a reasonably equitable distribution
ofthe tax burden. This was mostassuredly true in Brazil, above
all in 1894 and 1896, as expressed in the voices of Corra,
Montenegro,andFreire, butit wasonlypartly true as far as the
Viscount of Paranagua’ and Rui Barbosa. Andit was not the
case in 1867, when the tax was proposed andthen collected to
meet expenses with the Paraguayan War (precisely what the
Lincoln Administration’s Treasury Secretary Chase had done
during the Civil War). The fact was that from Independence
through Campos Salles, successive budget deficits were a
constant cabinet concern. It was for this reason that the
Viscount ofJequitinhonhadefended the tax in 1867 andAfonso
Celso, in 1879; andthis is likewise what made the Viscount of
Paranagua’ do so once again shortly thereafter. Unsound
accounts most probably werenot Rui Barbosa’s only
reason for
proposing this tax. Indeed, as Kaldor suggests,
Barbosa was
motivated by the question of equity; however, the state
of
government accounts did lead him
to defend such= fe
import duties, which he abominated,
as well as others he
ansleindvecteased inequity, rooted
in their generalized
incidence, was the leitmotif of the
income tax proposal, the
negative effects this latter tax could have
on the accumulation
of wealth were decried byits critics, for example,
by council
members Paulino de Souza and Jer6énimo
José Teixeira Jnior at
the Council's 1893 meeting and later by the
Industrial Center
i 22.
aBra anitind antipathy for paying taxes
has often been
ited: the exporter repudiates export duties;
the importer,
BIG : ealthy and entrepreneurs, income tax;import duties; the w yy. : or
taxes
dP ty and inheritances taxes. The only
landowners, property e protectionist taxes or those that, since
that endleeBERD
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In Brazil, but not only here, it was so hard to accept that
taxes are a consequenceofsocial life because they were seen as
hampering economic progress by intervening on the market
and discouraging maximizing individuals. This line ofargument
was employed especially when it came to incometax. Butit is
worth noting that the sameliberalism did not extendtotariffs,
where identical voices demonstrated an inclination for protec-
tionist policies.
At the 1893 meeting of the Council of State, Paulino de
Souza complained that an incometax would discourage export
activities, already unfairly burdenedby export duties. Jernimo
Teixeira argued that such a tax would be a disincentive to the
worker and would have prejudicial effects on production, an
especially important consideration since government policy
wasto promote foreign immigration.Forits part, the Industrial
CenterofBrazil declared that income tax “repels capital” and is
a “treacherous tax” that would have theeffect of drugging the
national economy.
In nineteenth-century Europe there was a growing belief
that governmentshould balance the budget. The echoesofthis
idea reached Brazilian shores and most surely dismayed the
nation’spolitical elite, which could only manageto balanceits
finances by borrowing or by issuing currency. Successive
deficits as well as changing expectations regardingthe state’s
role made treasury ministers quickly realize import duties
would notsuffice in providing adequatefiscal receipts. In Brazil,
the balanced-budget idea gained greater groundstarting with
Joaquim Murtinho in the begining of 20th century; conse-
quently, so did the idea that the state should seek rapid,
efficient sources of funds. Income tax apparently managed to
justify itself in this way, in that it permitted more efficacious
collection both in termsofthe relation between increased tax
burden andincreased revenueandin termsof the possibility of
Controlling concealmentof taxable incomeorassets.
Income tax would thus serve two purposes: it would
Provide monies needed for the budget and it would soothe the
Social conscience concerned with theissueoffairness, progres-
Sive rate schedules appeasingit even more.
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Progressive taxes in Brazil, alwayspassedoverin favor of
proportional taxes, were defended explicitly by Rui Barbosa.
The progressive notion lay in the spirit of the law that enacted
this tax. Progressive taxation was already an old idea then;it
had been espoused by William Paley in 1785, echoed in the
Declaration ofthe Rights ofManin 1789, and stipulated byTom
Paine in his The Rights of Man in 1791-2. Scientifically legiti-
mized by marginalist theory, it triumphed as a recourse for
winning political approval of income tax, which in the end
included an exemption for those with very low incomes and
deductions for expenses on goodsessential to the physical and
moral survival of individuals, families, and companies.
It was eventually agreed thatfair principles should govern
social life, but these principles could nevertheless be endowed
with different contents. In the case of income tax, the
idea of
fairness that ultimately triumphed was one that demands
managementof prevailing economic and social
inequalities so
as to favor those with lesser advantages
(Rawls 1971). aiswas
its spirit; what income tax may actually
have accomplis
the real world is another matter altogether.
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himselfinto an Emperor, Brazil into an Empire and givingtitles ofCountsand Vicounts to the ruling class. Apart from some regional insurgencies,
